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Price Transmission Dynamics for Quality-Certified Food 
Products. A Comparison between Conventional and Organic 




Despite the vast number of works investigating price transmission processes in diverse agri-food 
markets, very little has been said about quality-differentiated products. In this paper, we compare 
the conventional and organic fluid milk sectors in Italy to better understand the economic 
organization and functioning of one of the most important agri-foods in Italy. Using a unique 
dataset featuring processor and retail (scanner) prices for the two types of milk, we estimate 
(M)TAR models to account for asymmetric price movements in both sectors, but the price 
transmission results are eventually symmetric. The VECM estimations and IRFs analysis provide 
significant insights into the differences between the two markets. [EconLit citations: Q130, Q110, 
C590 – Keywords: Fluid milk, Price Transmission, Organic vs. Conventional, Asymmetries] 
1. Introduction to the Study 
The analysis of price transmission (PT) mechanisms in food chains has attracted considerable 
interest among agricultural economists, mainly due to their welfare and policy implications. Price is 
the first link between economic agents, driving their strategic and structural decisions and giving a 
good measure of integration and thus chain dynamics (Abdulai, 2002; Goodwin and Holt, 1999; 
Lloyd, 2016; Serra and Goodwin, 2003).  
Despite the increasing literature about price transmission, there is a lack of studies investigating PT 
for quality-differentiated agricultural markets; therefore, a comparison with their conventional 
counterparts cannot be made. Consumer demand for healthier, safer, environmentally friendly and 
premium-quality foodstuffs has recently increased. This has shaped food industry offerings, and 
quality-differentiated products bearing specific claims have become available (Unnevehr et al., 
2010). Among those, we focused on organic-labeled fluid milk. Indeed, the demand for organic food 
products is on the rise in Europe, with a market value estimated at 20.8 billion euros in 2012. EU 
policymakers have recognized the importance of this emerging market through supporting organic 
farming, in light of its contribution in producing public goods (Meredith et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
Italy represents the fourth-largest organic market in Europe, with more than 2 billion Euros of retail 
sales, and the second-largest in terms of both organic producers, with approximately 52 thousand 
operators, and organic land, with more than 1.4 million hectares in 2015 (Willer et al., 2017).  
The objective of this study and its main contribution to the existing literature is to determine the 
price transmission mechanism of an organic food product, providing a comparison to its 
conventional counterpart and deepening the understanding of the economic organization and 
functioning of both markets. Although the Italian conventional fluid milk market has been the focus 
of several economic research papers in the last twenty years, few works have performed price 
transmission analyses, especially accounting for retail data prices. Distributors currently play a 
pivotal role in defining the functioning of the SC, channeling almost the entire households’ food 
basket and potentially exerting market power upstream, thus shaping structural and strategic 
decisions of other agents. Both ends of the milk SC (i.e., milk producers and consumers) have often 
identified retailers as the source of market disruptions, undermining the functioning of the supply 
chain and narrowing the effects of the milk crisis on upstream players. Discovering the PT 
mechanism between industrial producers and distributors in the last twenty years has shed light on 
how prices are passed through, thus unveiling actors’ behaviors and hence providing insights into 
operational and marketing strategies that they put in place. The recent increase in organic 
production in the milk sector reflects farmers’ response to low margins and the high uncertainty 
that characterizes the conventional milk market, in addition to the sharp increase in consumer 
demand for organic food products. Moreover, the EU established a certification and labeling 
procedure for organic products, exploiting the premium price that consumers are willing to pay for 
these quality products. However, the PT literature lacks studies regarding this differentiated milk 
sector, highlighting the need for a deeper understanding of the functioning of such an essential 
branch of the agri-food sector. Quality-differentiated products usually entail shorter chains and 
different distribution channels, features expected to support different price transmission dynamics. 
The Italian fluid milk market has been chosen as the case study because it represents one of the 
most important agri-food sectors in Italy. The dairy industry is a major asset that is worth 15 billion 
euros, 11.5% of the food industry turnover, and has an employed workforce of approximately 
30,000 people (Gonano and Mambriani, 2014). Moreover, Italy is the seventh-largest EU-28 milk 
producer, providing 7% of total EU (cow) milk (EUROSTAT, 2017). Hence, the conventional fluid milk 
market represents the benchmark for comparison with organic price transmission dynamics.  
A unique dataset provided by one of the most prominent Italian food distributors is used for the 
analysis; it includes processor and retail (scanner) prices for the two types of milk. These data yield 
insights into retailer marketing strategies for conventional and differentiated (i.e., organic) 
products. Indeed, price transmission studies largely use data for aggregate categories (e.g., dairy, 
meat, or apples), an approach that prevents generating robust results when the research objective 
concerns quality-differentiated products. Time-series econometrics is applied for investigating price 
transmission dynamics. The potential role of asymmetries is then explored through nonlinear 
univariate models. When linearity tests accept the null of linearity, a Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) is used to interpret long-run relationships, and Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) are used 
to understand short-run dynamics.  
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief analysis of the organic and conventional 
fluid milk sectors, whereas Section 3 illustrates the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the 
type of data used and the applied methodological approach. Section 5 presents the empirical 
results for each system, whereas Section 6 provides a discussion of the results, and Section 7 
concludes. 
2. The Organic and Conventional Fluid Milk Sectors in Italy 
The Italian dairy sector is undergoing a profound crisis, and organic production has grown 
tremendously as an instrument of differentiation and thus margin stabilization, representing a sort 
of safety net for troubled milk producers. Private dairy companies transform the raw milk delivered 
by farmers, producing 92% of the total fluid milk (ISTAT, 2018), which reaches consumers through 
retailers. In fact, modern distribution (MD) is currently the primary retail format in Italy, consisting 
of all those points of sale having large surfaces and self-service (AGCM, 2013) (see also Sckokai 
(2014) for a detailed classification of MD channels). According to the most recent data available, the 
CR(5) (Concentration ratio of the first five companies) of the MD channel is almost 50%, with nearly 
90% of household spending on fluid milk concentrated on this channel, justifying the concerns 
expressed by society and institutions over its impact on chain performance (Federdistribuzione, 
2013). On the supply side, raw conventional milk production relies on 157 thousand dairy farms 
(with at least one bovine head), accounting for more than 4.6 million heads of cattle and producing 
more than 11 million of tons of raw milk. The total amount of fluid milk produced reached 2.4 
million of tons in 2016 (ISTAT, 2018), with a sales value approximately 2.5 billion euros (Gonano and 
Mambriani, 2014). Compared to the numbers of the organic sector, the latter still represents a 
niche market within the Italian milk industry. Relying on the statistics provided by the Official Italian 
National Accreditation Body (ACCREDIA), there are 255 organic dairy farms currently active on the 
Italian territory and more than 57 thousand dairy cows. The total organic raw milk production 
achieved in 2015 was 215 thousand tons, of which 23.5 thousand tons were destined to fluid milk 
(statistics from SINAB - National Information System on Organic Farming). According to the Organic 
Data Network provided by Willer (2015), dairy products account for 18% of total organic sales, 
approximately 77 million euros, after fruits and vegetables (27%). Within the category of dairies, 
fluid milk represents the second most-sold product after yogurts, with 34% of overall sales, 
approximately 27 million euros. Organic milk represents almost 2% of total milk sales and 3.5% of 
total milk production in Italy. Organic supply chains are usually regarded as short supply chains, that 
is, the number of actors involved, from production to retailing, is lower than in conventional agri-
food chains. Upstream agents seem to be more organized since the constitution of producers’ 
organizations (POs) has been widely promoted and boosted by the European Commission and, 
consequently, by the national government. Moreover, the distribution sector is more competitive, 
since the MD channel represents just 27.4% of total organic sales, with specialized organic shops 
accounting for the lion’s share (45%) (Romeo and Bteich, 2014). Accordingly, one might expect that 
retailers in the organic market have a lower market power, if any, as the supply is also quite 
concentrated. Organic distribution is heterogeneous and less concentrated than in the conventional 
fluid milk supply chain. Consequently, we would expect symmetric responses from processors and 
retailers after unanticipated supply and demand shocks with quicker responses and of a higher 
magnitude, since the more competition the market features, the closer the price transmission 
process should be to a full pass-through.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we provide a simple theoretical framework to explain which type of relations exist 
between the industrial processors of milk and food distributors in terms of prices. Within each of 
the two chains, the product is considered homogeneous and produced on the Italian territory only, 
since it is a high-perishable product. Thus, we assume constant returns to scale1 and fixed-
proportion technology for both agents considered in the study (Sexton and Zhang, 2001). We 
consider a general (inverse) consumer demand function for the fluid milk at the retail stage, 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 = 𝐷𝐷(𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟,𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟)         (1) 
                                                          
1 See the seminal paper of McCorriston et al. (2001) for the interaction between returns to scale and market power. 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟 is the quantity of product at the retail level, 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 is an exogenous demand shifter, and 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 is 
the price faced by consumer on the final market. Likewise, the (inverse) supply function of the 
industrial processor is defined as   
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 = 𝑆𝑆(𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝,𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝)         (2) 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝 is the quantity of milk delivered by farmers and 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝 is an exogenous supply shifter. We 
assume that both milk processors and retailers use a constant-return technology and that no 
substitution is permitted between the raw milk delivered to processors and the other input used in 
producing the final products. Following Verreth et al. (2015), we assume that industrial processors 
act as price leaders; hence, retailers take the industrial processor price as given. Consequently, 
industrial processors determine the quantity of milk to be processed, relying on retailer’s behavior. 
Therefore, the retailer’s profit is maximized as  
max𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟 = 𝐷𝐷(𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 − 𝑆𝑆�𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 ,      (3) 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟 = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 represents the costs sustained by the retailer in handling one unit of 




𝑟𝑟 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 + 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟′(𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟)
𝛿𝛿𝑄𝑄𝑟𝑟
𝛿𝛿𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟 − 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = 0,      (4) 












 defines the conjectural elasticity of retailers, i.e., the degree of oligopoly power 





 represents the absolute value of the 
demand’s price elasticity. The conjectural variation elasticity describes the exertion of market 
power by retailers on consumers, taking a value of 1 when the distributor acts as a monopolist and 
a value of 0 when the market is perfectly competitive (Achayra et al., 2011; Huang and Sexton, 
                                                          
2 See Lloyd et al. (2006) and Sexton et al. (2007) for a detailed derivation process. 
1996; Sexton et al., 2007). In a competitive market, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 0; hence, 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 = 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 + 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 in (5), i.e., the retail 
price is equal to the processor price plus a constant cost. 
Since 𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟 ,𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟  are fixed constants, one should expect that (5) implies pass-through of changes in 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 





≥ 1. Moreover, this also implies the processor-retailer 














< 1.      (6) 
According to Kinnucan and Zhang (2015), EPT<1 is not inconsistent with the definition of 
competitive markets. Thus, a better test for imperfect competition concerns the slope of the price 
transmission relation.  Specifically, because equation (6) implies that under imperfect competition 
𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟
𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
> 1 (a one euro increase in wholesale price causes retail price to rise by more than one euro) 
rejection of 𝐻𝐻0 : 
𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟
𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
≤ 1 in favor of 𝐻𝐻1 : 
𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟
𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
> 1 would constitute evidence of retailers’ oligopoly 
power3. 
The above framework, however, assumes price transmission symmetry, as does most of the 
theoretical literature. However, most of the recent empirical work has shown that asymmetries in 
price transmission (APT) are the general rule, not the exception. Peltzman (2000) was the first to 
generalize this idea, investigating a large number of markets and finding asymmetric behaviors in 
more than two of every three analyzed sectors. Indeed, a significant strain of the literature found 
APT, and several hypotheses have been explored by academics to explain such dynamics4. Retailers’ 
market power is the most frequently identified cause (see, among others, Bailey and Brorsen, 1989; 
Verreth et al., 2015; Borenstein et al., 1997; Lloyd et al., 2006; McCorriston et al., 2001; Sckokai et 
al., 2013; Sexton, 2013; Shrinivas and Gómez, 2016; Simioni et al., 2013), although further studies 
                                                          
3 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this useful comment. 
4 Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) provide a thorough summary of the leading causes of asymmetry. 
(Acosta and Valdés, 2014; Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000; Peltzman, 2000; Serra and Goodwin, 
2003) conclude that the exertion of market power and high concentration ratios are not fully 
consistent with asymmetries. Consumers’ search costs may differ from one product to another, 
depending on the structure of the supply chain. In other words, only when price changes are higher 
than a certain level do consumers start their search in further retailers. That is, below a certain 
threshold, retailers are free to increase prices and hence margins, since consumers still perceive 
search costs as higher than the increased price (Borenstein et al., 1997; Ben Kaabia and Gil, 2007). 
Additional causes of APT have been debated, including substitutability between agricultural and 
other marketing inputs (Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000; McCorriston et al., 1998), adjustment 
costs (Azzam, 1999; Chavas and Mehta, 2004), product perishability (Santeramo, 2015; Santeramo 
and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2016; Ward, 1982), policy intervention (Brümmer et al., 2009; 
Cacchiarelli et al., 2016; Esposti and Listorti, 2013; Ihle et al., 2012; Kinnucan and Forker, 1987; Lee 
and Gómez, 2013; Santeramo and Cioffi, 2012), asymmetric information (Bailey and Brorsen, 1989) 
and inventory costs (Reagan and Weitzman, 1982). Tifaoui and von Cramon-Taubadel (2016) 
recently investigated the impact of the temporary sale price (TSP) on price transmission for butter 
in Germany, arguing that the “valleys” generated from TSP increase the speed and asymmetry of 
vertical price transmission. Recently, McLaren (2015) developed a theoretical framework to explain 
the existence of asymmetric price dynamics if there exist sufficiently convex marginal cost curves 
for market intermediaries, consistent with the monopsony power exerted by them. Investigating 
the relation between export intermediaries and farmers for a broad range of agricultural products 
and countries, he found that decreases in farm prices are far more completely passed to FOB prices 
than increases. Therefore, intermediaries use their market power to benefit from stretching 
margins, since they resell the agricultural product on the international market. Certainly, this logic 
can be applied to other types of market linkages between different agents (in our specific case, 
between food processors and retailers). One may expect the latter to exert market power and the 
so-called “rocket and feather” dynamics to occur (i.e., food-processor price increases are more fully 
and quickly transmitted to retail prices). According to McLaren (2015), the relation between retailer 
and industrial processor at the optimum can be specified as  
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟� = 𝑤𝑤(𝑄𝑄�) = 𝑤𝑤�𝑄𝑄�(𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝)�,        (7) 
where 𝑄𝑄�(𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝) is the processors’ supply function5, with 𝑄𝑄�𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝�
′
> 0 and 𝑄𝑄(𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝)′′ ≤ 0, 𝑤𝑤(𝑄𝑄�) the 
inverse supply function of retailers, with 𝑤𝑤(𝑄𝑄�)′ > 0 and 𝑤𝑤(𝑄𝑄�)′′ ≥ 0, and 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟� ,𝑄𝑄�  the retail price and 
quantity maximizing the profit, respectively (for the detailed methodology and derivation, see 
McLaren (2015)). The retail price is treated as exogenous, whereas the processor price is 
considered endogenous. Firms are assumed to be price takers in the retail market and to exert 
monopsony power for the processed product. One can evaluate the presence of asymmetry taking 




2 .          (8) 
 If the latter is equal to zero, the transmission is symmetric. Restrictions are put on both supply 
functions’ shapes, resulting in (7) having a negative sign and hence producing a concave 
relationship between the two levels of the chain. Indeed, given the highly perishable nature of fluid 
milk, one should expect negative asymmetries6 to exist, with retailers fearing spoilage (i.e., a 1% 
decrease in processor price is more fully passed to the retail price, Ps, than is an increase) (see 
diagram A in Figure 1). However, a different assumption about the marginal cost curve may be set, 
since one rather expects positive instead of negative asymmetries. The marginal cost curve would 
become steeper, losing convexity and modifying the relationship between the two prices, which 
turns convex (see diagram B in Figure 1).   
                                                          
5 Summing over all processors’ individual supply functions 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖), with 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖�𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖�
′ > 0, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖)′′ ≤ 0. 
6 According to Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004), positive asymmetries exist whenever the system responds 
faster to squeezing- rather than stretching-margin situations. Negative asymmetries occur when the opposite situation 
exists. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Most recent studies about dairy and fluid milk markets have obtained mixed results. Analyzing dairy 
products in Austria, Amador et al. (2010) demonstrate the existence of positive asymmetries 
between producer and retail levels, characterized by a higher degree of concentration. The same 
results were obtained in Capps and Sherwell (2007) and Zeng and Gould (2016) in their studies 
regarding fluid milk market in the US and in Bakucs et al. (2012) concerning Poland. On the other 
hand, Acosta and Valdés (2014) found that negative asymmetries exist in the Panama dairy sector, 
which experienced an increased concentration level in recent years. Likewise, the results of 
Awokuse and Wang (2009) regarding milk price transmission in the U.S. indicated negative 
asymmetries. Serra and Goodwin (2003) found symmetric adjustment in highly perishable dairy 
products in Spain despite a highly concentrated retail level. Concerning the Italian fluid milk sector, 
Cavicchioli (2013) and later Madau et al. (2016) detected the exertion of market power from 
retailing toward farmers along the fluid milk supply chain. The results obtained by Sckokai et al. 
(2013) in their study regarding Parmigiano Reggiano and Grana Padano cheeses in Italy (the two 
major products of the quality-certified dairy industry) provide no evidence of market power from 
retailer toward processors, whereas there are signs of market power toward consumers. Table 1 
summarizes the results obtained in the most recent works regarding price transmission in the fluid 
milk market.  
[Table 1 about here] 
4. Modeling Asymmetric Price Transmission  
The presence of cost frictions may entail thresholds in the price transmission mechanism (Ben-
Kaabia and Gil, 2008; Lee and Gómez, 2013; Meyer, 2004), and only when deviations exceed the 
threshold(s) is an adjustment triggered (Abdulai, 2002; Balke and Fomby, 1997; Goodwin and Holt, 
1999; Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Different market structures and product 
characteristics involve different search and information costs for consumers, so threshold models 
may provide a more suitable modeling technique to account for these types of cost frictions.   
The Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model was first discussed by Tong (1983) and later revisited by 
Enders and Granger (1998), who introduced a model variation, the Momentum-TAR (M-TAR), 
increasing the model’s popularity since then (for recent research in agricultural economics applying 
a TAR framework, see Abdulai (2002), Lee and Gómez (2013), Simioni et al. (2013), Goychuk and 
Meyers (2014), Tekgüç (2013), Awokuse and Wang (2009), Surathkal et al. (2014) and Han et al. 
(2016), among others). Engle and Granger (1987) showed that when two variables are co-
integrated, an Error Correction Model (ECM) can be specified as  
∆p1t = Φj(p2,t-1-β0-β1p2,t-1) + ∑ Γi
k-1
i=1 ∆p1,t-i + ∑ δi
k-1
i=1 ∆p2,t-i + εt,  (9) 
where pi,t, i = 1,2 are prices at two different levels of the supply chain, β0 is a constant term, the 
term inside the brackets specifies the error correction mechanism (i.e., ECT), Γi and δi are matrices 
of short-run parameters estimating the effect of shocks on ∆pi,t, and εt is a disturbance term 
i. i. d. ~WN(0,σ2). Concerning the TAR approach, Enders and Granger (1998) specified an 
alternative error correction specification, arguing that in the presence of asymmetries, the two-
steps Engle and Granger approach was misspecified. Therefore, they specified the error correction 
term as 
∆µt� = �
ρ1µ�t-1 + εt if µ�t-1 ≥ τ
ρ2µ�t-1 + εt if µ�t-1 < τ
 ,       (10) 
where ∆µt�  is the differenced ECT, τ represents the threshold value (i.e., zero in this case), and a 
necessary condition for {µ�t} to be stationary is that -2 < (ρ1, ρ2) < 0. A formal method to quantify 
the adjustment process is 
∆µt� = Itp1µ�t-1 + (1-It)p2µ�t-1 + εt,       (11) 
where It is the Heaviside indicator function It = �
1      if µ�t-1 ≥ τ
0      if µ�t-1 < τ
. Whenever the system is 
convergent, 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡� = 0, whereas when ?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡−1 is above (below) its equilibrium value, the adjustment is 
𝑝𝑝1?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡−1 (𝑝𝑝2?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡−1). Accordingly, the error correction representation in (9) can be specified as  
∆𝑝𝑝1𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝1?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝2?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛤𝛤𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘−1𝑖𝑖=1 ∆𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘−1𝑖𝑖=1 ∆𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 + εt.  (12) 
The MTAR specification described in Enders and Granger (1998) consists of adding lagged changes 
to the {?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡} process, such that Equation (12) can be now expressed as ∆𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡� = 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝1?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡−1 + (1 −
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝2?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖Δ?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘−1𝑖𝑖=1 + εt. Accordingly, the Heaviside indicator can be now specified as 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = �
1      𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Δ?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡−1 ≥ 0
0      𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Δ?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡−1 < 0
. The latter model is preferred when a series exhibits more “momentum” in 
one direction. Regarding the estimation of the threshold, there is no theoretically based argument 
for assuming a zero threshold a priori (Simioni et al., 2013), hence Chan's (1993) technique, which 
estimates a super-consistent threshold is applied. However, it is first necessary to test the existence 
of threshold cointegration (i.e., 𝐻𝐻0:𝜌𝜌1 = 𝜌𝜌2 = 0), and only when the null hypothesis is rejected in 
favor of threshold cointegration is asymmetric adjustment necessary (i.e., 𝐻𝐻0:𝜌𝜌1 = 𝜌𝜌2).  
5. An Application to the Italian Conventional and Organic Fluid Milk System 
The dataset for each conventional and organic market is composed of 170 monthly observations 
covering the period of 2001-2015 (see Figure 2). Prices are expressed in €/liter, defining the 
amount paid (per unit of product) by retailers to processors (purchasing or processor price, 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝) and 
the price paid by consumers on the final market (selling or consumer price, 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠). The series were 
transformed into their logarithmic forms, mitigating the fluctuations and increasing the likelihood of 
stationarity after first differencing (Hamilton, 1994). Unit-root tests were used to interpret the 
stochastic properties of the series, for identifying non-stationary series and for selecting the right 
determinist term(s) for accurate modeling.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
After excluding the presence of a trend, a constant was included when testing for unit-root7, since 
this improves the stability of results and, particularly for price transmission analysis, accounts for 
the current margin between prices over time. The Phillips-Perron (PP) (Phillips and Perron, 1988), 
the Generalised Least Square-Augmented Dickey-Fuller (GLS-ADF) (Elliott et al., 1996) and the KPSS 
(Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) tests for unit-root were applied8. All the unit-root tests conducted on the 
two price systems led to the conclusion that the series are 𝐼𝐼(1) (see Table 1A in the Appendix). 
When the same battery of unit-root tests was applied to variables in first differences, they proved 
to be 𝐼𝐼(0), confirming that the series are (stochastic) difference stationary processes. 
5.1. Long-Run Relationships 
Since all prices are 𝐼𝐼(1), the following step consists of testing for cointegration for each pair of 
prices within each system. Regarding the organic market, to appropriately model price 
transmission, four impulse dummy variables were included, accounting for atypical spikes, taking 
the value of 1 for October 2007, February 2008, January 2013 and June 2014 and 0 otherwise. 
Likewise, due to a break in the mean of the series in the period of March 2005 - May 2012, a shift 
dummy was included. Bearing in mind that the data refer to a single private economic agent, 
atypical behaviors along the series could have been triggered by economic events caused by private 
agreements between the parties involved, thereby preventing complete understanding of series’ 
dynamics. The AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) suggested a VAR(7), and the Johansen (1988) 
cointegration test was applied accordingly (see Table 2), restricting both the constant and the shift 
dummy to the cointegration space:  
∆Pt = α�β′Pt−1 + 𝜇𝜇1′ + 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡�+ ∑ Γik−1i=1 ∆Pt−i + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,1 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,2 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,2 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,3 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,4 + εt, (13) 
                                                          
7 The F test statistics for linear restrictions: 𝛽𝛽 = 0, 𝛾𝛾 = 0 in the ADF regression ∆Υ𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + Υ𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗∆
𝑝𝑝
𝑗𝑗=1 Υ𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 +
εt were 3.62 and 3.68 for conventional and organic milk, respectively, which are less than the C.V. at 5% 6.49 (Ф3). See 
Dickey and Fuller (1981) for further details. 
8 The standard ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981) and the PP tests suffer from low power and size distortions, leading 
to over-reject the hypothesis of unit root (DeJong et al., 1992; Ng and Perron, 2001; Schwert, 1989). To overcome such 
limitations and provide reliable results, we use the KPSS and the GLS-ADF jointly with the PP tests. See Table 1A in the 
Appendix for detailed results of the unit-root tests performed. 
where 𝜇𝜇1′  and 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 are deterministic terms restricted to the cointegration space, namely, the 
constant and the shift dummy, respectively, the 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,m,𝑚𝑚 = 1,2,3,4 are dummy variables, as 
described above, α is the so-called loading matrix, and β′ is the long-run coefficient. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Since the 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 accepted one cointegrating relationship, whereas 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 did not, the Engle and 
Granger (1987) methodology was also applied. The results clearly indicate the two prices share a 
long-run equilibrium relationship9 as follows: Ps = 0.39 + 0.53Pp + 0.03Ds,t + ?̂?𝜇t, where 
Ds,t represents the shift dummy. 
When considering the conventional fluid milk supply chain, the same methodological steps as above 
were adopted. The graphical inspection suggests the presence of a structural break in the series 
around March 2010 and four major price spikes, for which four impulse dummies were modeled 
accordingly10. Relying on the AIC, four lags have been included, and a VAR(4) was specified11. The 
results of the Johansen test indicated that we failed to reject the null of no cointegration. Hence, as 
suggested by Juselius (2006), we split the sample into two sub-samples, since structural breaks may 
invalidate the assumption of constant parameters. Given the date of the structural change, the two 
new specimens were defined for the periods of January 2001-February 2010 and March 2010-
February 2015. Regarding the first sub-sample, a VAR(2) was specified according to the AIC, and a 
constant was restricted to the cointegrating vector as 
 ∆Pt = α(β′Pt−1 + 𝜇𝜇1′ ) + ∑ Γik−1i=1 ∆Pt−i + εt.   (14) 
Neither 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 nor 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 indicated evidence of cointegration; accordingly, a VAR in first differences 
was specified. For the second sub-sample, a VAR(3) was specified based on the AIC, and a constant 
                                                          
9 The Engle-Granger test did not accept the null of non-stationary residuals, with a p-value of 0.006 (Tau-statistic: -
3.564). 
10 The four impulse dummies were 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑚𝑚 = 1,𝑚𝑚 = 1,2,3,4 for 2006:01, 2008:04, 2008:12, and 2010:03, respectively, 
and zero otherwise. 
11 For the model specification, see (13). 
restricted to the cointegrating space was employed12. The results from Johansen’s 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚, 
indicated the existence of one cointegration relationship (Table 2), which has the following 
expression: Ps = 0.28 + 0.72Pp + µ�t. 
As discussed in Section 3, non-linear asymmetries have been proved to be quite common behavior 
for a large number of agricultural markets at present, including dairy products. Accordingly, TAR 
and M-TAR models were considered using the residuals from the two estimated long-run 
equilibrium relationships detailed above (see Table 3). Concerning the organic system, both the AIC 
and SBC (Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion) indicated the need to include seven lags for Δ?̂?𝜇𝑡𝑡−1 to exclude 
any autocorrelation from residuals. Although point estimates for 𝜌𝜌1 and 𝜌𝜌2 indicate convergence, 
i.e., they are all negative and satisfy the condition (1 + 𝜌𝜌1)(1 + 𝜌𝜌2) < 1, the Φ and Φ∗ coefficients 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of no-cointegration. Therefore, neither threshold cointegration 
nor asymmetric mechanism were detected regarding the organic fluid milk supply chain (see the 
fourth and fifth rows in Table 3, respectively). Likewise, the conventional market is well described 
by a symmetric transmission mechanism, since we fail to reject the null of no cointegration (see the 
tenth and eleventh rows in Table 3). 
[Table 3 about here] 
To ensure that the linear model is superior to the nonlinear one, the Hansen (1999) linearity test 
was employed. According to results of the performed linearity tests13, price transmission dynamics 
for both the organic and conventional systems were estimated via linear VECM(6) and VECM(2), 
respectively. The performed misspecification tests (see Doornik and Hendry, 1997) showed 
satisfactory results for both.  
Table 4 reports the estimates of both cointegrating vectors, in addition to hypothesis tests on long 
and short-run parameters and on the slope of the price transmission relationship. Although the 
                                                          
12 For the model specification, see (14). 
13 We tested the residuals for the presence of autocorrelation (Breusch-Godfrey Test), ARCH effects (Multi-ARCH LM), 
and normal distribution (Jarque-Bera) (the results are available upon request).  
parameter 𝛽𝛽 is usually referred to as the long-run price transmission elasticity14, Lütkepohl and 
Reimers (1992), and most recently Lloyd et al. (2006, p. 129), argue they are “[…] by construction 
partial derivatives predicated on the ceteris paribus assumption”, and when richer dynamics occur 
(i.e., there is a feedback system in terms of causality), such inferences may be not of interest. 
Moreover, Kinnucan and Zhang's (2015) work heavily contributes to the idea that a price 
transmission elasticity equal to one does not mean perfect transmission, with this statement being 
inconsistent with the model of Gardner (1975). These authors showed that if the price changes are 
caused by shocks on the supply side (i.e., the industrial processor in our specific case), the PT 
elasticity (EPT hereafter) has to be less than one. Indeed, as clearly proved by Kinnucan and Zhang 
(2015), for EPT=1 to hold, the retail-demand and the processor-supply curves must have the same 
elasticity, which would be quite unusual and against the literature’s findings regarding agricultural 
supply elasticity. Hence, both the long-run price transmission expressed as the percentage change 
and the slope were estimated by using natural logarithms and natural numbers, respectively, for 
both markets. Analyzing the first row of Table 4, concerning the quality-differentiated milk market, 
the unrestricted cointegrating vector is reported, characterized by a 𝛽𝛽 estimate of 51%. As 
indicated in the third row, there is no long-run price homogeneity [𝛽𝛽(1,−1)] 15, so when a 1% 
change on the processor price occurs, the transmission of such shocks to the retail price is not 
perfect  but rather smaller.  
In any case, as mentioned in Section 3, we cannot provide very useful economic insights because 
price transmission elasticity less than one is compatible with different market structures. To work 
with slopes, complementarily, we have estimated the model in nominal prices to test whether the 
                                                          
14 See, among others, Abdelradi and Serra, 2015; Ben-Kaabia and Gil, 2007, 2008; Brümmer et al., 2009; Busse et al., 
2012; Conforti, 2004; Goychuk and Meyers, 2014; Hassouneh et al., 2015; Listorti and Esposti, 2012b; Simioni et al., 
2013; Tekgüç, 2013; and Verreth et al., 2015. 
15 After normalizing on consumer price, the process is (just-)identified, and further (non-identifying) restrictions on 
short and long-run parameters are imposed to enable economic interpretability of the results. Because the restrictions 
are asymptotically χ2(𝑣𝑣) distributed, with 𝑣𝑣 the number of imposed restrictions, the LR statistic is adequate for testing. 
slope is equal one. The results indicate that the null hypothesis of unity cannot be rejected (p-
value=0.092); hence, the organic market is characterized by competitive behavior16. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Regarding short-run parameters, weak-exogeneity test on the load matrix indicates the 𝑃𝑃P is weakly 
exogenous (see fifth row), and a cost-push mechanism well describes the dynamic of price 
transmission. Since the null hypothesis could not be rejected, the processor price does not adjust to 
deviations in the long run and all the adjustment falls on the retail price. The coefficient 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 =
−0.05 features a quite slow error correction, i.e., 5% each period, taking around twenty months to 
resettle into the steady state. 
Opposite to its counterpart, the conventional milk sector is characterized by perfect long-run price 
homogeneity. Every percentage change in the processor (retailer) price generates a percentage 
change of the same size and direction in the consumer (processor) price. On the other hand, when 
testing for the slope of the PT relationship using prices in nominal values, the null of a slope equal 
to one is rejected (p-value=0.001), discarding the idea of a competitive system. Analyzing short-run 
parameters, only the retail price adjusts to deviations in the long run (i.e., cost-push mechanism), 
since the processor price proves weak-exogeneity. Exploiting the perfect transmission relationship, 
when prices are expressed in their natural logarithms, we restricted the cointegrating on the long-
run price homogeneity. The constant did not vary significantly, whereas the 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 moved from -0.38 
in the unrestricted case to -0.20 in the restricted one, decreasing by nearly 50%; hence, the retail 
price adjusts 20% of the disequilibrium in each period. The retailer’s mark-up on the processor is 
given by the equation of Tiffin and Dawson (2000), as reported in the last row of Table 4. Given that 
the average percentage margin for the second sub-sample approaches 24%, such results are 
                                                          
16 The literature assumes marketing costs as constant, whereas one may argue this is not a realistic assumption 
considering a fifteen years period. As described by Kinnucan and Zhang (2015), omitting marketing costs in the 
estimating equation results in attenuation bias in the pass-through rate. Generally, it is assumed to be biased towards 
zero, prejudicing the test in favor of perfect competition hypothesis. Hence, caution needed when interpreting results 
(we are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point). 
consistent. However, no data concerning the cost structure of retailers are available, so no further 
comments on such results can be made. Moreover, this would go beyond the scope of this work. 
5.2. Short-Run Dynamics 
Impulse Response Functions were computed to gain more insights into the short-run dynamics of 
both investigated markets. These reveal price responses to an unexpected shock to the system. 
When the VECM(p) is stable, responses are represented as a Moving Average (MA) process, where 
the MA coefficient matrices contain the IRFs. Nevertheless, the residuals’ variance and covariance 
matrices are non-diagonal, invalidating the assumption that shocks occur in just one variable, which 
may generate a misleading picture of existing dynamic relations. In other words, there exists 
contemporaneous correlation within the system. For this reason, orthogonalized IRFs (i.e., making 
the error terms uncorrelated) are preferred; they are obtained through the Wald decomposition of 
the MA representation (Lutkepohl, 2005). The orthogonal IRFs have been normalized on the 
estimate at time ‘zero’ of the impulse variable, and the ordinate axis displays the unit change 
(Figure 3). IRFs represent a good indicator of price dynamics along the supply chain. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Regarding the organic system, the own-price response to shock on the processor side is positive 
and significant, as expected, and it persists significantly up to the 19th period. The retail price 
positively responds after two months, with the response lasting until the 8th month. The system 
then reaches a new equilibrium, and all prices respond significantly to any shocks. Own response to 
shocks on the consumer side, is, again as expected, positive and significant until the 16th period. 
The response of processor price is positive and significant starting from the third month, 
overcoming the initial shock and reaching its maximum after seven periods. After reaching the 
apogee, it starts decreasing and lasts significantly until the 11th month. Finally, since the magnitude 
of the response is greater when a shock occurs on the demand-side, a demand-pull mechanism 
seems to explain price transmission behavior in the organic sector better.  
Considering conventional milk, especially for the first sub-sample, all the computed IRFs were non-
significant, and prices move independently of one another17 (according to IRFs results, the system 
was not cointegrated). However, regarding the second sub-sample, when a shock occurs on the 
offer side, both prices return to the steady state after approximately eight months. However, only 
the response of processor is significant and positive, and only for the first quarter, after which it 
starts decreasing and becomes negative, co-moving again with the retailer price. The retailer price, 
however, does not show any statistically significant response, although it displays a very moderate 
and positive response for the first four months and later becomes negative. When the shock is on 
the demand side, the own price response is quick and positive and reaches equilibrium after about 
eight months. Likewise, 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 reacts positively but becomes significant only after four months.  
6. Discussion 
A comparison between the two fluid markets reveals some significant differences. First, for the 
organic supply chain, the results showed a more responsive market than the conventional one, 
since cointegration has been found for the whole period. When the conventional fluid milk market 
is considered, prices started to co-move only from 2010. Indeed, for the preceding period, the 
results suggest that prices at the retail (processor) level are mainly determined by the retail 
(processor) supply and demand, not by the price paid to processors (sold at the retail level). 
Therefore, any unexpected shock occurring on any side of the chain is not transmitted either 
upstream or downstream. The comparison of results from each market indicates that the elasticity 
transmission and the speed of adjustment parameters are higher in the conventional market when 
logarithms are considered (the speed of adjustments after an unexpected shock in the organic 
market is four times less than in the conventional counterpart, and there is no evidence of long 
price homogeneity). Nevertheless, when prices at their natural levels are used in the estimation of 
the price dynamics, the quality-differentiated milk sector is revealed to be a competitive market 
                                                          
17 Because of space limitations, IRF figures are not presented here but are available on request. 
since the slope of the relationship between the two prices is equal to one18. Different market 
structures between the organic and conventional sectors influence the mechanism of price pass-
through. Whereas supermarkets and hypermarkets concentrate a significant share of the final 
demand for conventional fluid milk, in the case of the organic product, alternative marketing 
channels play a much more relevant role, reducing the market share of supermarkets and 
hypermarkets. Borrowing the hypothesis number three in Borenstein et al. (1997), we can argue 
that search costs for the organic milk consumer are higher, in the sense that when prices change, 
the expected gain from searching other distributors is smaller than for their conventional 
counterpart. Therefore, this may reduce (temporarily) the elasticity of the consumer demand and 
dampen the speed of adjustment. The still-limited awareness of the consumer of organic food, in 
general terms, together with a still-restricted access to information for this niche market could 
explain such a higher search cost. Moreover, because informal distributors (i.e., farmers’ markets 
and direct sales) represent a significant part of organic-food retailing, the consumer may have to 
engage in intense research to understand whether price changes are due to market conditions or 
simply marketing strategy. 
The short-run dynamics show that for the organic system, an increase in the consumer price causes 
a larger increment on the processor side; this result suggests that supply is inelastic (as expected, 
an increase on the demand side produces a larger increase on the production side, since the 
quantity produced is fixed in the short run), and upstream chains are better organized. Organic milk 
producers are fewer in number, improving their bargaining power and allowing for a better 
management on the supply side, thus improving the capability for coping with adverse market 
situations. Moreover, the processor reacts quicker than in the conventional case, and the 
magnitude of the response is significantly higher. When shocks occur on the supply side, the 
                                                          
18 See footnote 16. 
consumer price response is significant, and a new equilibrium is reached. Changes in regulations, 
production methods or quality standards affect the cost-structure of producers, and shocks may 
become permanent.  
In the conventional fluid milk market, after 2010, we observe a certain stickiness in the retail price, 
which may reflect the fact that when shocks occur on the supply side, the retailer absorbs the shock 
without transmitting it to the customer. They then most likely exert market power to pressure the 
processor to lower their selling price, which explains the rapid decrease of processor response. 
When demand-side shocks occur, the retailer tends to increase the volume purchased, causing an 
increase in processor price and a quick decrease in consumer price. Since supply shortages of fluid 
milk are exceptional, we consider here only positive shocks due to an increase in demand. The delay 
in processor response may be a consequence of private agreements; for instance, only when the 
milk spot price exceeds a certain threshold, previously agreed by the two actors, does the price paid 
to processors increase, since the processor cost structure changes substantially19. The most recent 
studies regarding the fluid milk sector many often conclude the price transmission dynamics is 
asymmetric (see Table 1). Nevertheless, our results are consistent with those of Serra and Goodwin 
(2003) for the Spanish market, whose characteristics are quite similar to those of the Italian sector 
and with those of Bakucs et al. (2012) for Hungary. Because fluid milk a low value-added product, 
this could prevent APT and tighten relationships between industrial processors and retailers (Serra 
and Goodwin, 2003). However, as indicated in Table 1, this comparison must be performed 
cautiously: each study is country-specific, and the vertical relationship investigated varies across 
studies, as does the direction of causality. Considering the speed of adjustment (see the last column 
in Table 1), it is distributed within a quite wide band, from 2% to 39% of shock transmitted in one 
period. One might say the speed is strongly dependent on the market structure and agent 
                                                          
19 The SPOT milk price is the reference price for crude milk at the farm gate in Italy, i.e., the reference price 
for farmers. 
characteristics. Accounting for this, the two speeds of adjustment that we found for the 
conventional and the organic milk sector in Italy are within the band (20% and 5%, respectively), 
despite the fact that organic milk prices have yet to be considered in any study, to the authors’ 
knowledge. According to Serra and Goodwin (2003), Peltzman (2000), and Santeramo and von 
Cramon-Taubadel (2016), highly perishable products reveal a (more) symmetric PT mechanism. Kim 
and Ward (2013) and Ward (1982), despite both finding APT for perishable products, describe how 
retailers may be reluctant to increase prices, fearing sales reduction and hence increased spoilage.  
7. Conclusions 
The main objective (and contribution) of this paper was to determine price dynamics in a quality-
differentiated market in relation to its conventional counterpart. The organic fluid milk market was 
used as a case study. The methodological approach was based on time series econometrics, with a 
special focus on asymmetric price dynamics.  
The results suggest a number of points. First, in the case of the Italian fluid milk market (either 
organic or conventional), price reactions to unanticipated supply and demand shocks are 
symmetric, mainly for two reasons: i) the monthly frequency of our dataset, which contributes to 
smooth the price series; and ii) despite the high degree of perishability of milk, most of the vertical 
relationships between farmers and processors are based on long-term contracts. Second, in both 
markets, the entire adjustment process occurs on the consumer price, a result consistent with the 
literature. In fact, (see also Table 1, fifth column) the lion’s share of PT-related works found 
causality running from upstream levels to retailers, not vice versa. Therefore, only retail prices 
adjust when upstream prices change, whereas the latter are often exogenous and do not adjust to 
changes in consumer prices. However, the magnitude and the speed of the adjustment to a new 
equilibrium differ in both markets, as both are characterized by different market structures. In the 
conventional market, the higher retailer-concentration may oblige distributors to readjust quickly to 
the equilibrium, since it would be easier for the consumer to switch from one retailer to another. In 
the organic market, the supermarkets’ market share is less significant, and alternative marketing 
channels are available, generating a slower adjustment since heterogeneous distributors prevent a 
quick pass-through. Moreover, the null of a slope equal to unity has not been rejected indicating 
the existence of a competitive behavior. However, results must be interpreted with caution. 
Assuming constant marketing costs, albeit in line with the literature, may entail attenuation bias, 
prejudicing the test in favor of perfect competition hypothesis (see Kinnucan and Zhang (2015) for 
further details).  
Short-run dynamics depict a more favorable situation for organic milk, and both the magnitude and 
the speed of the responses overcome those on the conventional side.  
Asymmetries between the last two levels of the supply chain do not appear to exist. However, 
asymmetries may exist between the farm gate and the other economic agents along the supply 
chains, which should be explored in the future when reliable data become available. Moreover, the 
results should be interpreted with caution, as this study was based on scanned data from a single 
retailer and generalization could be problematic. In any case, this study opens new opportunities 
for further research, as new studies about price dynamics in quality-differenced products are 
necessary to understand better how different market and governance structures influence the 
performance of their respective supply chains. Furthermore, for more efficient pass-through 
estimates, retailers’ costs should be considered in the estimating equation. 
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Table 1- Summary of Most Recent Studies regarding Price Transmission Mechanisms in Fluid Milk Markets 
Author(s) Country Relationship Data Frequency Causality Main Results Type of Relationship 
 α 
estimates(a) 
(Amador et al., 
2010)  Austria 
Farmer-
Retailer Monthly Farmer->Retailer 
Pass-through rate more than 
proportional, no long-run price 
homogeneity. Shocks in farmer 
price entail persistent effects on 
the consumer price 






Retailer Monthly Farmer->Retailer 
Decreasing farm prices: from 1 to 6 
months for a full shock 
transmission; increasing farm 
prices: from 1 to 3 months 







Farmer->Retailer (in 6 
out of 11 cities) 
In the short-run, retail price 
responds differently depending on 
the sign of the change. In the long-
run, it takes several months for the 
retail price to reflects the farmer 
price change  
Positive Asymmetries 0.14 







(Hungary); Different market structures entail 
different PT dynamics 
Positive Asymmetries (Poland) 0.22 
Retailer->Farmer 
(Poland); Symmetric (Hungary) 0.20 
(Awokuse and 
Wang, 2009)  U.S. 
Farmer-
Retailer Monthly Farmer <-> Retailer 
The presence of asymmetric 
dynamics should be taken into 
serious consideration when 
designing new policy reforms 
Negative Asymmetries 0.31(-); 0.04(+) 
(Acosta and 
Valdés, 2014) Panama 
Farmer-
Wholesaler Monthly Farmer->Wholesaler 
The speed of convergence is 
"moderately slow" (i.e., 9% of the 
shock is transmitted for each 
period 
Negative Asymmetries 0.09;  0.32(-) 
(Serra and 






(weekly freq.); farmer 
prices more elastic 
retail prices changes 
(monthly freq.) 
Symmetric PT in highly perishable 
dairy product prices. Slow 
adjustment of retail prices to farm 
price shocks 
Symmetric (for high perishable 
dairies); Asymmetric (for long 
shelf-life dairies) 
- 
(a) Absolute values. When displayed, ‘+’ and ‘-‘ signs refer to increasing and decreasing margins, respectively. Otherwise, the coefficient refers to linear VECM 
estimation. We reported only statistically significant coefficients 
Source: Authors’ personal elaboration
 
Table 2 – Johansen Co-integration test 
𝒑𝒑 − 𝒓𝒓 a 𝒓𝒓 b 𝝀𝝀𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒓𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 C.V. p-Value 𝝀𝝀𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕𝒎𝒎 C.V. p-Value 
Organic Milk System 
2 0 22.362 20.164 0.023 14.09 15.892 0.094 
1 1 8.272 9.142 0.074 8.272 9.165 0.074 
Conventional Milk System 
2 0 39.686 20.164 0.00 18.217 15.892 0.021 
1 1 6.366 9.142 0.249 4.362 9.165 0.361 
a, b Number of common trends, where p is the number of variables and r the number of cointegrating relationships, the 
rank of the matrix Π 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Table 3 - Threshold Models Estimates 
 TARa  TAR consistenta(*) M-TARa M-TAR consistenta(*) 
Organic Milk System 
𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏 
-0.111  -0.0742 -0.141 -0.354 
(0.059)  (0.062) (0.061) (0.107) 
𝝆𝝆𝟐𝟐 
-0.159  -0.193 -0.117 -0.105 
(0.069)  (0.065) (0.067) (0.049) 
𝛕𝛕 0  0.013 0 0.003 
𝚽𝚽𝒖𝒖 and 𝚽𝚽𝒖𝒖∗  (𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏 = 𝝆𝝆𝟐𝟐 = 𝟎𝟎) c 3.679  4.628 3.541 6.366 
F-test (𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏 = 𝝆𝝆𝟐𝟐) d 0.352  1.273 0.088 5.471 
  C.V.
b 
𝚽𝚽𝒖𝒖  and 𝚽𝚽𝒖𝒖∗  5.519  7.029 6.225 8.567 
F-test 3.374  6.909 3.682 8.408 
Conventional Milk System 
𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏 
-0.179  -0.122 -0.153 -0.155 
(0.104)  (0.107) (0.096) (0.086) 
𝝆𝝆𝟐𝟐 
-0.230  -0.275 -0.299 -0.419 
(0.106)  (0.100) (0.129) (0.179) 
𝛕𝛕 0  0.012 0 -0.002 
𝚽𝚽𝒖𝒖 and 𝚽𝚽𝒖𝒖∗  (𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏 = 𝝆𝝆𝟐𝟐 = 𝟎𝟎) c 3.402  4.047 3.804 4.333 
F-test (𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏 = 𝝆𝝆𝟐𝟐) d 0.138  1.273 0.846 1.778 
  C.V.
b 
𝚽𝚽𝒖𝒖  and 𝚽𝚽𝒖𝒖∗  5.570  6.817 5.924 8.214 
F-test 3.234  6.384 3.577 8.408 
Values between brackets are the standard errors 
a AIC selected seven lags for the 𝚫𝚫𝝁𝝁�𝒕𝒕−𝐢𝐢 (𝒑𝒑𝐦𝐦𝐦𝐦𝐦𝐦 = 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎) for Organic and four lags for Conventional models, respectively 
(*) For the two models, the threshold value was estimated through Chan’s methodology 
b Critical Values were simulated for 5% sig. level (1,000 Monte Carlo simulations) 
c Test for threshold cointegration 
d Test for asymmetric price adjustment 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
  
Table 4 – Organic Milk System: Results from Cointegration Analysis, Restrictions on Deterministic, 
Long- and Short-run Coefficients 
Organic Milk System 
Unrestricted cointegrating vector 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 − 0.51 𝑃𝑃P − 0.40𝜇𝜇1′ − 0.04𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 
Linear Restrictions LR-Statistic P-Value 
Long-run Homogeneity 𝛃𝛃(𝟏𝟏,−𝟏𝟏) 5.45 0.020 
Weak Exogeneity 𝜶𝜶𝑷𝑷𝒑𝒑 = 𝟎𝟎 0.131 0.720 
Exclusion Testa 𝝁𝝁𝟏𝟏′ = 𝟎𝟎 4.520 0.033 
Exclusion Testb 𝑫𝑫𝒔𝒔,𝒕𝒕 = 𝟎𝟎 4.880 0.027 
Conventional Milk System 
Unrestricted cointegrating vector 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 − 0.72 𝑃𝑃p − 0.28 = 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 
Long-run Homogeneity 𝛃𝛃(𝟏𝟏,−𝟏𝟏) 3.49 0.062 
Weak Exogeneity 𝜶𝜶𝑷𝑷𝒑𝒑 = 𝟎𝟎 0.04 0.85 
Restricted cointegrating vector 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 − 𝑃𝑃p − 0.24 = 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 
Retail Margin (𝑒𝑒0.24 − 1) × ln𝑃𝑃p × 100 = 27,5% 
a,b The last two rows refer to the exclusion tests, which show whether the deterministic terms, i.e., the constant and 
the dummy, enter the cointegration space. The model is well-specified since for neither parameter does the LR statistic 
accept the null hypothesis of exclusion. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
  
Appendix 
Table A1- Unit-Root Tests 
Conventional Milk System Organic Milk System 
ADF-GLS Unit Root ADF-GLS Unit Root 
With Constant (𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝) (𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠) With Constant (𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝) (𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠) 
Tau -0.194 -0.235 T-Stat -0.0757 -0.316 
P-Value 0.616 0.601 P-value 0.657 0.572 
MAIC* 1 1 MAIC* 2 2 
PP Test PP Test 
Z_t -1.321 -2.108 Z_t -0.557 -1.297 
P-Value 0.619 0.242 P-Value 0.876 0.630 
KPSS Test KPSS Test 
T-Stat 7.095 5.776 T-Stat 4.827 4.078 
P-Value <0.01 <0.01 P-value <0.01 <0.01 
Lag Truncation 1 1 Lag Truncation 2 2 
ADF-GLS Unit Root ADF-GLS Unit Root 
With Constant (∆𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝) (∆𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠) With Constant (∆𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝) (∆𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠) 
Tau -4.630 -9.484 Tau -7.771 -8.458 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 P-Value 0.000 0.000 
MAIC* 5 4 MAIC* 1 4 
PP Test PP Test 
Z_t -11.642 -9.100 Z_t -11.642 -13.169 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 P-Value 0.000 0.000 
KPSS Test KPSS Test 
T-Stat 0.043 0.096 T-Stat 0.083 0.303 
P-Value >0.10 >0.10 P-Value >0.10 >0.10 
Lag Truncation 4 4 Lag Truncation 4 4 
*Modified Akaike Information Criterion, see Ng and Perron (2001) for more details. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
  
 Figure 1 – The Relationship between Processor and Retailer Prices 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on McLaren (2015) 
 
  
Figure 2 – The Organic (left) and Conventional (right) Milk Systems (prices expressed in logarithms)          






























































































































































































































































Figure 3 – Conventional (Upper-panels) and Organic (Lower-panels) System: Orthogonalized IRFs for 
shocks to both Pp (Left panel) and Ps (Right panel) 
*A mark shows when the response is significant 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
